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ABSTRACT 
Design work and design knowledge in Information Systems (IS) is important for both 
research and practice. Yet there has been comparatively little critical attention paid 
to the problem of specifying design theory so that it can be communicated, 
justified and developed cumulatively. In this essay we focus on the structural 
components or anatomy of design theories in IS as a special class of theory. In 
doing so we aim to extend the work of Walls, Widemeyer and El Sawy (1992) on the 
specification of information systems design theories (ISDT), drawing on other 
streams of thought on design research and theory to provide a basis for a more 
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systematic and useable formulation of these theories. Eight separate components of 
design theories are identified: (1) purpose and scope; (2) constructs; (3) principles 
of form and function; (4) artifact mutability; (5) testable propositions; (6) justificatory 
knowledge (kernel theories); (7) principles of implementation; and (8) an expository 
instantiation. This specification includes components missing in the Walls et al. 
adaptation of Dubin (1978) and Simon (1969) and also addresses explicitly 
problems associated with the role of instantiations and the specification of design 
theories for methodologies and interventions as well as for products and 
applications. The essay is significant as the unambiguous establishment of design 
knowledge as theory gives a sounder base for arguments for the rigor and 
legitimacy of IS as an applied discipline and for its continuing progress. A craft can 
proceed with the copying of one example of a design artifact by one artisan after 
another. A discipline cannot.  
 
Keywords: design theory, design science, constructive research, philosophy of 
science, information systems, information technology, artifacts, theory structure 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult to over-emphasize the significance of design work and design 
knowledge in Information Systems (IS) for both research and practice. Theories for 
design and action continue to be highly influential in IS, despite the fact that they 
are not always recognized as theories. Some seminal examples include structured 
systems analysis (Gane and Sarson, 1979) and the Systems Development Life 
Cycle (SDLC) model. Design theories also give prescriptions for the architecture of 
specific applications, such as decision support systems (Turban and Aronson, 
2001), a type of knowledge that forms a large part of curricula in IS, software 
 2 
engineering and computer science education. Moreover, this knowledge has vital 
relevance to practitioners working with information systems. As van Aken (2004, p. 
220) argues eloquently, one needs prescription-driven research that provides 
solutions for management problems in addition to description-driven research that 
enables us to understand the nature of problems but leaves undone the task of 
developing sound change programs. Increasing attention is being paid to this type 
of research in IS, notably by March and Smith (1995) and Hevner et al. (2004). The 
ISWorld website now has a section on design research with a current overview 
provided by Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004/5). Some major issues, however, remain 
relatively unexplored. 
 
One important issue is how design knowledge is captured, written down and 
communicated. Herbert Simon in his seminal work The Sciences of the Artificial 
(1996, p. 113) argued that we need a science of design that is “tough, analytic, 
partly formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine”. Making design science 
formalizable, at least in part, means that we need to pay attention to how design 
knowledge is expressed as theory. Gregor (2006) shows how design theory can be 
seen as the fifth in five classes of theory that are relevant to IS: (1) theory for 
analysing; (2) theory for explaining, (3) theory for predicting; (4) theory for 
explaining and predicting; and (5) theory for design and action. The distinguishing 
attribute of theories for design and action is that they focus on “how to do 
something”. They give explicit prescriptions on how to design and develop an 
artifact, whether it is a technological product or a managerial intervention. Of 
course, for this type of theory, as Hevner et al. (2004) show, we also need to 
consider epistemological questions of how knowledge is acquired and tested. This 
 3 
current essay, however, does not concern research methods or research 
approaches, important as they are, but the ontological components of the theory 
itself. We are taking a meta-theoretical view of the nature of design theories in IS in 
general. The aim of the paper is to show the structural components (the anatomy) 
that are needed to communicate a design theory.  
 
The focus of the paper is on the anatomy of design theories in the discipline of IS, 
although much of the underlying literature in our discussion comes from a range of 
disciplines and it is possible that our arguments have wider applicability.  However, 
a characteristic that distinguishes IS from other fields is that it concerns the use of 
artifacts in human-machine systems.  Lee (2001, p iii) uses these words:  
 
Research in the information systems field examines more than just the 
technological system, or just the social system, or even the two side by side; in 
addition, it investigates the phenomena that emerge when the two interact.  
 
Thus, we have a discipline that is at the intersection of knowledge of the properties 
of physical objects (machines) and knowledge of human behavior, and it is possible 
that IS design theories may take on a different form from those in other disciplines. 
The IS discipline is increasingly seen as one concerned with the design, 
construction and use of artifacts based on information technology (IT), although the 
exact range and nature of the artifacts of interest is a matter of some debate (see 
Dahlbom, 1996; Orlikowski and Iacono, 2001; Benbasat and Zmud, 2003). The term 
artifact is used to describe something that is artificial, or constructed by humans, as 
opposed to something that occurs naturally (Simon 1996).  
 
 4 
A central issue that must be acknowledged is that some researchers would argue 
with the use of the word “theory” for design-type knowledge, preferring to restrict the 
word to the possibly more familiar natural-science (and, later, social-science) types 
of theory. Gregor (2006) highlights the differences in views on what constitutes 
theory, and shows that there are both proponents and opponents for the five types 
of theory she identifies. With respect to theory for design and action, Simon (1996) 
is the well-recognized proponent of this form of theory and others have followed his 
lead (Iivari, 1983; Markus et al., 2002; Walls et al., 1992). Van Aken (2005) uses the 
term “Management Theory” for prescriptive, solution-oriented knowledge that 
encompasses “technological rules”, while distinguishing more description-oriented 
knowledge as “Organization Theory”.  
 
Otherwise there is some feeling against recognizing design principles as theory. 
March and Smith (1995) and Hevner at al. (2004) promote design science as a 
research activity, but tend to reserve the word “theory” for natural-science-type 
research (Type 3 and 4 theory in Gregor, 2006). The seemingly different views may 
in part be semantic and depend on individual views of what is meant by theory, as 
outlined above. A broad view of theory is adopted here, congruent with Gregor 
(2006) and the OED (2004), which means that the term theory encompasses what 
might be termed elsewhere conjectures, models, frameworks, or body of knowledge 
- terms that are used in connection with design science by many authors. For 
example, Hevner et al. (2004), see “constructs, models and methods” as three of 
the four outputs of design science, with the “artifact” being the fourth. A broader 
view of theory means that the first three outputs are regarded as components of 
theory.  
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We believe that it is of vital importance to investigate how design knowledge can be 
expressed as theory (see also Purao, 2002; Rossi and Sein, 2003; Vaishnavi and 
Kuechler, 2004/5), although some might argue that the benefits of design research 
can be enjoyed without the need for theories of design. The weakness of this latter 
view is demonstrated by Cross (2001, p. 4), who deals comprehensively with the 
idea of design as a discipline.  Cross shows how at one level design work can 
proceed without reflection on theory: 
 
We must not forget that design knowledge resides in products themselves: in the 
forms and materials and finishes which embody design attributes. Much everyday 
design work entails the use of precedents or previous exemplars – not because of 
laziness by the designer but because the exemplars actually contain knowledge of 
what the product should be. This is certainly true in craft-base design: traditional 
crafts are based on the knowledge implicit within the object itself of how best to 
shape, make and use it. This is why craft-made products are usually copied very 
literally from one example to the next, from one generation to the next.     
 
However, we would prefer that IS rises above the level of a craft and agree with 
Cross, who says that in addition to this informal product knowledge, we need for 
design research:  
the development of more formal knowledge of shape and configuration – theoretical 
studies of design morphology. (Cross, 2001, p. 5, emphasis added) 
 
Seeking to express IS design knowledge as theory means we give a sounder basis 
for arguing for the rigor and legitimacy of IS as an applied discipline, in comparison 
with the older, more traditional disciplines in the natural sciences, which use a 
 6 
complementary, but different paradigm.1Our own experience has shown how both 
students and more experienced researchers struggle with the problem of 
expressing design knowledge in an acceptable form in theses and journal articles. 
Better understanding of the nature of design theory provides an avenue for the 
more systematic specification of design knowledge.  
 
Furthermore, understanding the nature of IS design theories supports the 
cumulative building of knowledge, rather than the re-invention of design artifacts 
and methods under new labels in the waves of “fads and fancies” that tend to 
characterize IS/IT. As an example, the basic problem of understanding how to 
capture the tacit knowledge of experts remains much the same whether it is studied 
for expert systems or knowledge management systems, and whatever the 
application domain. Our design theories should be classified and compared under 
the most general statement of the problem being addressed that can be found (the 
purpose and scope of the theory), for example, “capturing tacit knowledge from 
experts in organizations”.  A claim for a better theory needs to show that the new 
theory provides an advance on all previous methods for solving this problem, no 
matter in which disciplinary sub-field they have been proposed. Again, personal 
experience has shown that this requirement is not well understood by many authors 
and this shortcoming is a common cause of journal papers being rejected for not 
making a sufficient theoretical contribution.  
 
As an initial introduction to the idea of design theory structure, Table 1 shows how 
1 This issue in one also for many other applied disciplines such as accounting, education, management 
marketing, engineering, and other fields of information technology, marketing, engineering, and other 
fields of information technology. 
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our proposed anatomy of a design theory can be detected in Codd's articles 
introducing the relational database model. This anatomical skeleton, consisting of 
eight fundamental components, is what we derive more thoroughly in the remainder 
of this essay.  
Table 1: Example of the skeleton of a design theory (from Codd, 1970, 1982) 
Article details The design theory anatomy 
The introduction says better database technology is 
needed to increase human productivity. 
(Motivation is also provided: This need is significant 
because current approaches are failing.) 
 
The purpose and scope of the 
theory are stated. 
The relational database model has principles such 
as “the order of rows in the tables is arbitrary and 
irrelevant”. 
Principles of form and 
function incorporating 
underlying constructs (such as 
“table”) are given. 
The argument is made that the relational model 
allows for relatively simple adaptation and change to 
base tables, while user views appear unchanged. 
 
Artifact mutability is 
addressed. 
Statements are made such as “A relational 
database can perform as well as a non-relational 
database”. 
 
These statements are testable 
propositions. 
It is shown how the relational model works, by 
reference to underlying set theory and also human 
cognitive processes. 
 
Justificatory knowledge 
(kernel theory) is provided. 
Guidelines are given on how to produce a relational 
database through normalization procedures. 
 
Principles of implementation 
are given. 
An illustration of working relational databases is 
provided. 
 
An expository instantiation is 
given. 
 
The anatomy of design theories has received relatively little critical attention.  Walls 
et al. (1992, p. 36) made a valuable initial attempt at this problem and we build on 
this work. These authors defined an information systems design theory (ISDT) as “a 
prescriptive theory which integrates normative and descriptive theories into design 
paths intended to produce more effective information systems”. In 2004 Walls et al. 
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provided a retrospective on the fate of their ISDT formulation and they expressed 
some disappointment about what they saw as its limited use. They wondered if their 
specification was too unwieldy or cumbersome for general use, or too difficult to 
grasp, and concluded that their ISDT required “much more work in being complete 
and in making the exposition more palatable” (p. 55). We agree that it is timely to 
consider whether improvement in their specification model is possible.  
 
The primary sources drawn upon by Walls et al. in their 1992 paper were Dubin’s 
(1978) depiction of theory of the natural-science type and Simon’s (1981) depiction 
of the sciences of the artificial. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the novelty of their 
endeavor and the dual aims of their article, these authors did not capture fully the 
range of ideas offered by Dubin and Simon, or ideas that have been presented in 
other important related work. Two of Dubin’s mandatory theory components are 
missing from the specification by Walls et al. These components are the “units”, the 
constructs that are the basic building blocks of theory, and “system states”, the 
range of system states that the theory covers.  The problem of specifying a theory 
for methodologies as opposed to a theory for a product was not explicitly addressed 
and their formulation had some unnecessary complexity in that it required kernel 
theories for design product and design process to be separated. Furthermore, Walls 
et al. (2004) themselves wondered if their depiction of design theory components 
was too unwieldy for use. They looked at the comparatively few articles that had 
explicitly referred to their formulation of ISDT, but did not consider the continuing 
over-arching tradition of presenting design-type work in our IS journals (see Gregor, 
2006; Morrison and George, 1995; Orlikoski and Iacono, 2001), where there are 
alternative forms. The structures implicit in other design-type work in this substantial 
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history gives clues as to what might be more familiar and more useable ways of 
presenting design theories.  
 
The contribution of the current paper is that it proposes solutions for the problematic 
areas of the Walls et al. depiction of ISDTs and extends their work by reference to 
other sources, providing for a more complete, yet arguably simpler, definition of 
design theories. 
 
The paper begins by examining different perspectives on design theories.  The 
problems with existing work are highlighted and a way forward is proposed, which 
recognizes an overarching set of eight components of an ISDT: (1) purpose and 
scope; (2) constructs; (3) principles of form and function; (4) design mutability; (5) 
testable propositions; (6) principles of implementation; (7) justificatory knowledge; 
(8) an expository instantiation. Each component is defined and discussed. The 
applicability of this ontological specification language is illustrated through the 
analysis of examples of design research. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the implications of this delineation of an ISDT. 
II. APPROACHES TO DESIGN THEORIZING 
A number of perspectives on design research and theory that preceded the work by 
Walls et al. (1992) are outlined here under the headings of the philosophy of 
science and technology, constructive research and design science, and the 
sciences of the artificial. It will be seen that this prior work does not display a clear, 
logical progression – rather the work has proceeded differently and under different 
labels in different geographic areas (especially in Europe as opposed to North 
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America) and in different research traditions and disciplines.  Researchers in some 
streams of thought appear to be unaware of work that has occurred previously and 
there has been little prior attempt to integrate the different perspectives. The review 
of a number of different streams of thought gives a basis for the subsequent critical 
examination of the work by Walls et al. and the proposal for its extension, by 
integrating ideas drawn from a number of perspectives.   
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
When talking about the nature of theory, a logical place to start is the philosophy of 
science, which has dealt with issues concerning theory building, specification and 
testing exhaustively for a very long time. In general, philosophers of science writing 
in the tradition of the physical or natural sciences are likely to see theory as 
providing explanations and predictions and as being testable. For example, 
Popper (1980) held that theorizing, in part, involves the specification of universal 
statements in a form that enables them to be tested against observations of what 
occurs in the real world. Popper described theory as follows (1980, p. 59):  
 
Scientific theories are universal statements.  Like all linguistic representations 
they are systems of signs or symbols. Theories are nets cast to catch what we call 
‘the world’; to rationalize, to explain and to master it.  We endeavour to make the 
mesh even finer and finer. 
 
Dubin’s (1978) monograph is a seminal and comprehensive source for treatment of 
the structural nature of theory of the type that is common in the natural and social 
sciences. Dubin specified the seven components of this type of theory as: (1) the 
units whose interactions are the subject of interest; (2) laws of interaction among 
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the units; (3) boundaries within which the theory is expected to hold; (4) system 
states within which the units interact differently; (5) propositions or truth statements 
about the theory; (6) empirical indicators related to the terms in the propositions; 
and (7) testable hypotheses incorporating empirical indicators. Dubin regarded the 
first five of these components as essential for theory specification, while the final 
two components were optional and could be included for theory testing purposes.  
There is one point on which we take issue with Dubin’s otherwise excellent work. 
Dubin followed the rather narrow position of logical positivism as expressed by 
Duhem (1962), who believed that physical theories should exclude explanations. 
Logical positivism is now largely regarded as defunct for a number of good reasons 
(see Magee, 1998; Passmore, 1967; Popper, 1986) and the goal of explanation is 
now seen as central in current conceptualizations of theory (Nagel, 1979; Popper, 
1980), with a web of supportive statements and underlying explanations for the 
propositions that are proposed as the core of the theory.  As we reject the ideas of 
logical positivism, we are in agreement with the more prevalent view that theory 
should include explanations.  
 
Recognition that theory might relate to technology is not common and there may 
be some prejudice against it among philosophers of science (see O’Hear, 1989). As 
an example, a recent anthology edited by Schaff and Dusak (2003) gives an 
overview of work in philosophy relating to technology, but it provides little to help 
with the task of uncovering the nature of theory in technological disciplines. The 
volume includes an essay by Bunge (1979), who deals with the philosophical inputs 
and outputs of technology and recognizes a number of high-level, cross-disciplinary 
theories arising from technology, including information theory, control theory and 
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optimization theory.  Bunge notes that the problems of the philosophy of technology 
include the nature of technological knowledge and its relationship to scientific 
knowledge, but does not explore this problem in detail.  
 
Some relevant ideas can be traced back to Aristotle’s writing on the four 
explanations of any “thing” in The Four Causes (from a translation by Hooker, 
1993). The sense in which Aristotle spoke of a thing being “explained” or “caused” 
corresponds to its “definition” and thus is relevant to the idea of a theory for 
specifying artifacts. Aristotle’s four causes can be applied to any artifact, such as a 
table. These four causes explain the artifact in terms of: 
• The causa finalis, its final cause or end, what the table is for (eating from, 
placing things on);  
• The causa formalis, its formal cause or essence, what it means to be a table 
(possessing a raised surface which is relatively flat supported by leg(s); 
• The causa materialis, its material cause, what it is made from (wood); 
• The causa efficiens, its efficient cause, who or what made the table (the 
carpenter).  
Aristotle did not relate scientific knowledge or a theory of design to his explanation 
of an artifact and yet his ideas have commonalities with later work, including 
Simon’s descriptions of the artificial. Heidegger (1993, p. 313) built on Aristotle’s 
work in seeking to identify the essence of modern technology. Heidegger showed 
that Aristotle’s four causes differed from one another yet belonged together in 
considering the nature of an artifact. Further, the coming together of the four causes 
in an object is an example of poiēsis, the arising of something from out of itself, as 
for example, in the bursting of a blossom into bloom.  
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THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 
The classic work that gives the knowledge underlying the construction of artifacts 
the status of theory is Herbert Simon’s The Sciences of the Artificial (1996) first 
published in 1969. Simon believed design theory was concerned with how things 
ought to be in order to attain goals, although the final goals of design activity might 
not be explicitly realized, and the designer could well proceed with a search guided 
by “interestingness”. To Simon, an objective of design activity was the description of 
an artifact in terms of its organization and functioning, although he believed a theory 
of design might only be partly formalizable. He stressed the design of a complex 
artifact as a hierarchy, which could be decomposed into semi-independent 
components, corresponding to its many functional parts.  
 
Simon saw the design process as generally concerned with finding a satisfactory 
design, rather than an optimum design, with the design process affecting the final 
design: “both the shape of the design and the shape and organization of the design 
process are essential components of a theory of design” (pp. 130-131). The design 
process could be informed by knowledge of the laws of natural science, both for an 
artifact’s internal operations and its interactions with the external environment. Many 
artifacts are designed, however, without a full understanding of the workings of its 
component parts and a theory of a system design “does not depend on having an 
adequate microtheory of the natural laws that govern the system components. Such 
a microtheory might indeed be simply irrelevant” (p. 19). 
 
 Simon had a number of things to say about the design of evolving artifacts, where 
forecasting the likely path of events is extremely difficult. In such circumstances, he 
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recommended the mechanisms found in adaptive systems for dealing with change: 
homeostatic mechanisms that make the system relatively insensitive to the 
environment and retrospective adjustment to the environment’s variation based on 
feedback. Thus, design for the future need not rely on the envisioning of remote 
events, but can rely on adaptive mechanisms built into the design. 
CONSTRUCTIVE RESEARCH AND DESIGN SCIENCE 
A separate strand of work parallels work on design theory but has a different focus. 
In this work the emphasis is on design research as a knowledge-building activity, 
rather than the structural nature of the knowledge or theory that results.  
 
European researchers have exhibited one substrand of thought. Iivari (1983) 
distinguished theorizing at a prescriptive level early on, using the term 
‘systemeering’, a word coined for ‘systems work’ to match the Swedish word 
‘programmering’ for programming. Iivari (1991) described this activity as 
“constructive” research in subsequent work. Further development of these ideas 
can be found in Iivari, Hirschheim and Klein (1998), Jarvinen (2001) and Kasanen et 
al. (1993).  
 
North American researchers described similar perspectives under the label of a 
“systems development” approach to research. Nunamaker, Chen and Purdin (1990-
91) provided a multi-methodological approach that included the steps of theory 
building (conceptual frameworks, mathematical models and methods), systems 
development (prototyping, product development and technology transfer), 
experimentation (computer simulation, field experiments and laboratory 
experiments) and observation (case studies, surveys and field studies). Lau (1997) 
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and Burstein and Gregor (1999) provide further discussion. 
 
The software engineering community has also addressed concerns with 
methodological design issues. For example, Gregg et al. (2001) introduced a 
research methodology focused on technological innovations with stages for: (i) 
conceptual grounding; (ii) formal description and verification; and (iii) development 
to demonstrate validity. Preston and Mehandjiev (2004) give a framework for 
classifying intelligent design theories so as to support software-engineering design 
and pay some attention to “knowledge representation”, which corresponds to our 
term “design theory” and lists its elements as “requirements, component, process 
and goals”.  
 
Comparable work has been promoted in IS as “design science” through the work of 
March and Smith (1995), who developed a framework to demonstrate the 
relationship, activities and outputs of design and natural science research in 
information technology. The design science ideas of March and Smith have enjoyed 
recent currency with a number of authors using or building on their ideas (Au, 2001; 
Ball, 2001; Hevner and March, 2003; Hevner et al., 2004).  
 
A common element in the different sub-strands of these constructive research 
approaches is the emphasis on the central role of the artifact, which is seen as a 
vital part of the process and possibly the sole, or chief, output of the research. The 
construction of an artifact which is sufficiently novel is seen as a significant 
contribution in its own right. This view is in contrast to the Walls et al. (1992) IS 
design theory approach, where the artifact is constructed as a “test” of the design 
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theory. The question this stream of research leaves us with is whether the artifact 
itself, the concrete instantiation, has a place in a design theory.  
WORK IN OTHER DISCIPLINES  
A number of disciplines apart from IS have also approached the problems of design 
research. Several older disciplines explicitly concerned with design, including 
architecture and industrial design, have a history of design-science concerns. Cross 
(2001) traces the desire to ‘scientize’ design back to the 20th Century modern 
movement of design, noting that the term “design science” was probably introduced 
in the 1960s by the inventor and radical technologist, Buckminster Fuller, who called 
for a design science revolution based on science, technology and rationalism.  
 
The design patterns approach arose in architecture (Alexander et al., 1977) and 
sought to describe a particular problem within a context, the forces arising from that 
context and a solution that resolves those forces. Design patterns have found 
application in a range of disciplines as diverse as object-oriented design (Gamma, 
et al. 1995), systems analysis (Fernandez, 1998) and the architecture of enterprise 
systems (Fowler, 2003).  
 
Further relevant work appears in management (van Aken, 2004, 2005), 
management accounting (Kasanen et al., 1993), accounting information systems, 
(David et al., 2000), art (Owen, 1997) and education (Savelson et al., 2003; Kelly, 
2003). Schön (1983) linked the development of professional knowledge to 
“reflection–in–action”.  
 
Van Aken (2004, 2005) has addressed the problem of what prescriptive 
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management theory might look like and advances the idea of “technological rules”, 
which take the form: “If you want to achieve Y in situation Z, then something like 
action X will help” (2004, p. 227). Although of interest for our present endeavor, the 
field of management is less concerned with the design of products (as in database 
architecture) than with methods or processes (interventions), so has some 
limitations in being transferred to IS, where both are of interest. 
 
Love (2001) treats design theory from a philosophical perspective across a number 
of design disciplines and provides a meta-theoretical method with the aim of moving 
towards a simplifying paradigm of design research.  This work has parallels with 
what we are attempting in the current paper, though it takes a wider and more 
abstract view of the processes and levels of design theorizing. 
 
A theme with many of these design-based researchers is the importance of 
addressing problems and framing advice that is relevant to practitioners, and of a 
research process of iterative and reflective enquiry. This work, however, while 
recognizing that design theory can be generated, has with a few exceptions (for 
example, van Aken, 2004) little to say specifically on how it can be formulated. 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS DESIGN THEORY (ISDT) 
The task of formally specifying design theory in IS was taken up by Walls et al. 
(1992), who adapted Simon’s ideas for the IS context. Walls and his colleagues 
merged Simon’s ideas with those of Dubin (1978).   
 
Walls et al. specify the components of an ISDT as: (1) meta-requirements, the class 
of goals to which the theory applies; (2) meta-design, the class of artifacts 
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hypothesized to meet the meta-requirements; (3) design method, a description of 
the procedures for constructing the artifact; (4) kernel design product theories, 
theories from natural or social sciences that govern design requirements; (5) 
testable design product hypotheses, statements required to test whether the meta-
design satisfies the meta-requirements; (6) kernel design process theories, theories 
from natural or social sciences that inform the design process; and (7) testable 
design process hypotheses, statements required to test whether the design method 
leads to an artifact which is consistent with the meta-design.  
 
There are some questions about this specification. Two of Dubin’s mandatory 
requirements for theory specification are missing from the Walls et al. 
conceptualization. There is no element that corresponds to Dubin’s “units”, the 
constructs that are present in statements of relationships in the theory. Also missing 
is an element that recognizes that the phenomena that are studied, in both natural-
science type theory and ISDT, are systems or parts of systems.  Dubin introduced 
the component of “system states” for this purpose, so that a theory specification 
depicts the various states of the system that the theory covers. Dubin gives as an 
example Herzberg’s two-factor theory of job satisfaction (Herzberg, 1966), in which 
one state covered by the theory is where an individual has equal levels of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction.   
 
A further difficulty with the Walls et al. specification is what appears to be the 
unnecessary separation of theory components for a “design process” on top of a 
“design product” and the lack of clear definition of what comprises a “product” and 
what comprises a “process”. The unnecessary duplication is highlighted in the 
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example given by Walls et al. of Codd’s (1970) relational database theory. The 
kernel theory of relational algebra is shown as justification for the design method, 
but no kernel theory is given for the design product. In fact, it is likely that here, as 
with many other design theories, one single kernel theory would underlie both 
design product and design process.  
 
Furthermore, it is not clear exactly the nature of the things that are addressed by the 
“class of goals to which the theory applies”. Surely a design theory as a whole could 
apply to either a process or a product, and only sometimes to both. The Walls et al. 
(p. 43) article in fact says that one example of a widely accepted ISDT is the system 
development life cycle (SDLC).  The SDLC is a methodology that was intended for 
use in developing a broad range of systems. So here the object of the design theory 
is itself a methodology or process. In contrast, a design theory for a product such as 
a word-processor could be proposed that showed the architecture and functions of 
the system, but not specify the means of development, as the designed product 
could be built satisfactorily using a number of different methods.  Thus it appears 
that the ISDT need not mandate a design process as an essential component but 
rather, can itself concern a generalized process, methodology or intervention as its 
main object (a view congruent with Van Aken, 2004 and Carlsson, 2005).  
CONCLUSIONS FROM PRIOR WORK 
What can we conclude from this review of prior work? First, there is not a great deal 
of relevant previous work to draw upon. Dubin’s (1978) work on the structural nature 
of theory for the natural and social sciences is an obvious starting point, although 
following a logical positivist perspective, he omitted explanations as a component of 
theory. Simon’s (1996) work on the sciences of the artificial stresses the importance 
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of extending our thinking to the science of artifacts, but it does not include a detailed 
examination of the nature of theory that concerns artifacts. Researchers in design 
science have tended not to speak of theory in relation to design knowledge at all, 
but have focused more on design research as an activity that results in artifact 
construction.  
 
Walls et al. have drawn on both Dubin and Simon to give what is arguably the most 
comprehensive treatment of IS design theory structure to date, and we build on their 
work. However, a number of issues were identified in a critical examination of the 
Walls et al. specification of ISDT: 
 
1. A lack of clarity as to what ISDTs should be concerned with, whether product 
or process or necessarily both; 
2. The omission of the mandatory “units” (constructs) and “system states” in 
the adaptation of Dubin’s specification of theory components; 
3. A lack of consideration of the importance of a design instantiation, as 
stressed in the design science literature, except as a test of a theory. 
4. A possibly unnecessary distinction between kernel theories for design 
processes and kernel theories for design products. 
 
Against this background, we proceed with ideas for improving the specification of 
ISDT.  
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III. PROPOSED SPECIFICATION FOR ISDT 
We have used an analytic approach in proposing a revised specification framework 
for ISDT, following the arguments advanced in the preceding section. An analytic 
approach appears appropriate for our investigation, as prior work exists that has 
enjoyed some recognition, albeit with some deficiencies that we have been able to 
identify through analysis and comparison across approaches.  
 
Before advancing this revised framework, however, it is necessary to clarify the 
terminology to be used. First, it is proposed that a design theory can have as a 
primary design goal either (a) a methodology, such as the SDLC, or (b) a product, 
such as a decision support system.  These design goals correspond in van Aken’s 
terminology to “object-design” and “realization-design” (Van Aken, 2004, p. 226).  
 
The range of artifacts that are the object of design in the discipline of IS is illustrated 
in publications appearing in leading IS journals. The essay on the nature of theory in 
IS by Gregor (2006) analysed all research articles in MISQ and ISR from March 
2003 to June 2004. Nine of the 50 articles examined were classified as presenting 
theory for design and action. The artifacts that were the object of design theorizing 
included customer-centric websites, auction markets for supply chain organizations, 
schema for interorganizational workflows, organizational processes, and an 
information intermediary. This range covers both process and product artifacts, 
including those that are applied in organizational settings as well as more technical 
artifacts.  
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A design theory is something in an abstract world of man-made things, which also 
includes other abstract ideas such as algorithms and models.  A design theory 
instantiated would have a physical existence in the real world.  Figure 1 shows 
these different artifacts in relation to their human creators. This diagram is provided 
as there is sometimes confusion about the products and objects of interest in design 
research. March and Smith (1995) and Hevner et al. (2004, p. 78) see four design 
artifacts produced by design-science research: “constructs, models, methods and 
instantiations”. However these authors tend to see “theory” as the preserve of the 
natural-science type, although, on occasion, they use the word “theory” for the 
knowledge produced by design science. We would argue, using authorities such as 
Dubin (1978) and Nagel (1979) as a reference, that “constructs, models and 
methods” are all one type of thing and can be equated to theory or components of 
theory, while instantiations are a different type of thing altogether. 
 
Our position depends on a realist ontology being adopted, where realism implies 
that the world contains certain types of entities that exist independently of human 
beings and human knowledge of them (as opposed to idealism). At a high level our 
ontological position corresponds to ideas expressed by both Habermas and Popper. 
Habermas (1984) recognizes three different worlds - the objective world of actual 
and possible states of affairs, the subjective world of personal experiences and 
beliefs, and the social world of normatively regulated social relations.  These three 
worlds are related to Popper’s Worlds 1, 2 and 3 (Popper, 1986). World 1 is the 
objective world of material things, World 2 is the subjective world of mental states, 
and World 3 is an objectively existing but abstract world of man-made entities – 
language, mathematics, knowledge, science, art, ethics and institutions. Thus, 
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theory as an abstract entity belongs to World 3. A similar view is expressed by Love 
(2000) in relation to design theory.  This stance is also congruent with forms of 
realism enjoying currency in IS and allied fields.  Mingers (2000) shows how the 
philosophy of critical realism (following Bhaskar, 1989) can be applied to 
management science, where critical realism aims to establish a realist view of being 
in the ontological domain,  while accepting the relativism of knowledge as socially 
and historically conditioned in the epistemological domain. Popper’s Worlds 1 and 3 
parallel the intransitive and transitive domains of Bhaskar.  The relationships and 
interactions among these domains remain the subject of debate, yet the broad 
distinctions drawn here are important ones. The intransitive domain of objects and 
actions serves as a reference point and testing ground for theories that are the work 
of human beings in the transitive domain.  
 
 
To be more precise, the phenomena of interest for design research include: 
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1 Instantiations or material artifacts, which have a physical existence in the 
real world, as a piece of hardware or software, or IS, or the series of physical 
actions (the processes or interventions) that lead to the existence of a piece of 
hardware, software or an IS. This depiction of “processes” as material artifacts 
might be somewhat controversial, but we believe it is necessary for 
understanding the full range of design theories.  
2 Theories or abstract artifacts, which do not have a physical existence, except 
in that they must be communicated in words, pictures, diagrams or some other 
means of representation. Constructs, methods and models are all this type of 
artifact, with the word model sometimes being used synomously with theory and 
constructs being one component of theories (Dubin, 1978).  
3 Human understanding of artifacts. Human beings conceptualize and 
describe artifacts in abstract, general terms. The arrows in Figure 1 show that 
human beings create theories and constructs and use them to guide the building 
of instantiations in the real world and also to understand the material artifacts 
when in use. In addition, design principles and theory can be extracted from 
observation and inference from already instantiated artifacts. 
 
To further define terms as they are used in this paper, an IS design theory shows 
the principles inherent in the design of an IS artifact that accomplishes some end, 
based on knowledge of both IT and human behaviour. The ISDT allows the 
prescription of guidelines for further artifacts of the same type.  Design theories can 
be about artifacts that are either products (for example, a database) or methods 
(for example, a prototyping methodology or an IS management strategy).  As the 
word “design” is both a noun and a verb, a theory can be about both the principles 
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underlying the form of the design and also about the act of implementing the design 
in the real world (an intervention). 
 
As design theoretic knowledge is general, being applicable to all classes of cases, 
knowledge is needed for professionals to apply the knowledge in their own unique 
and specific cases, what Van Aken (2004) calls process-design.  As a design theory 
can apply to either a generalized product architecture, or to a generalized method, 
we have the interesting situation in the latter case where we need to consider a 
“process for implementing the principles of a generalized 
process/method/intervention”.  We can have a theory about a methodology in terms 
of its general principles and also guidelines as to how it is implemented in specific 
circumstances.   
 
It is important to clarify the ontological status of these artifacts of interest and also to 
understand the intricacies of the ways terms can be used, as this clarification has 
been lacking in the literature to date. We propose that the full specification of an 
ISDT could include eight components, as shown in Table 2. This framework extends 
that of Walls et al. by including the components of constructs, artifact mutability and 
an expository instantiation to overcome the shortcomings identified earlier. In 
addition, a single component for justificatory knowledge is shown instead of kernel 
theories for both product and process.  Our argument is that any design theory 
should include as a minimum: (1) the purpose and scope; (2) the constructs; (3) the 
principles of form and function; (4) the artifact mutability; (5) testable propositions; 
and (6) justificatory knowledge. Five of these components have direct parallels in 
the five components specified by Dubin (1978) as mandatory for a natural-science-
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type theory. The sixth component of justificatory knowledge needs to be added, to 
provide an explanation of why the design works. The goal of explanation is 
common to many current conceptualizations of theory as argued previously (Nagel, 
1979; Popper, 1980). 
  
 
Table 2 Eight components of an Information Systems Design Theory 
Component  Description 
Core components 
1) Purpose and scope  
(the causa finalis) 
 
“What the system is for”, the set of meta-requirements or 
goals that specifies the type of artifact to which the theory 
applies and in conjunction also defines the scope, or 
boundaries, of the theory.  
 
2) Constructs 
(the causa materialis) 
 
Representations of the entities of interest in the theory. 
3) Principle of form and 
function 
(the causa formalis) 
 
The abstract “blueprint” or architecture that describes an 
IS artifact, either product or method/intervention.  
4) Artifact mutability 
 
The changes in state of the artifact anticipated in the 
theory, that is, what degree of artifact change is 
encompassed by the theory.  
 
5) Testable propositions Truth statements about the design theory. 
6) Justificatory 
knowledge 
The underlying knowledge or theory from the natural or 
social or design sciences that gives a basis and 
explanation for the design (kernel theories). 
 
Additional components 
7) Principles of 
implementation 
(the causa efficiens) 
 
A description of processes for implementing the theory 
(either product or method) in specific contexts.  
8) Expository 
instantiation 
A physical implementation of the artifact that can assist in 
representing the theory both as an expository device and 
for purposes of testing. 
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Specifying the first six components is sufficient to give the idea of an artifact that 
could be constructed. The construction of an instantiation as proof-of-concept and 
the development of specific methods for building further instantiations could come 
later. The credibility of the work is likely to be enhanced, however, by provision of an 
instantiation as a working example. Some particular innovative ideas may have 
merit, despite the lack of an instantiation. The history of computing shows some 
conceptual work on design, without instantiations or implementation principles, has 
been influential. For example, Vannevar Bush first wrote of a device he called a 
Memex early in the 1930s. His subsequent essay "As We May Think" in 1945 has 
had a pivotal influence in hypertext research, foreshadowing the concept of 
hypertext links, although Bush provided no real-life working model for his ideas or a 
method for building a Memex. 
 
Table 3 shows how this specification compares with the standard for natural-
science-type theory as supplied by Dubin and the prior specification of design-type 
theory by Walls et al. A comparison with the work of Hevner et al. is not included, as 
these authors did not focus specifically on the nature of design theory. 
 
Table 3: Comparison of design theory approaches 
Proposed anatomical skeleton Dubin (1978) Walls et al. (1992) 
1. Purpose and scope Boundaries Meta-requirements 
2. Constructs Units  
3. Principles of form and function Laws of interaction Meta-description 
4. Artifact mutability System states  
5. Testable propositions Propositions 
Product hypotheses 
Process hypotheses 
6. Justificatory knowledge  
Product kernel theories 
Process kernel theories 
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7. Principles of implementation  Design method 
8. Expository instantiation Hypotheses and empirical indicators  
 
The following section explains each of the eight components of an ISDT in more 
detail. 
IV. THE EIGHT COMPONENTS OF AN INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS DESIGN THEORY 
Each of the eight components of a design theory is described in this section and 
illustrated by references to examples, including Codd’s relational database design 
model (Table 1), a design theory for a fault threshold policy for software 
development projects (see Table 4), a design theory for risk management (Table 5) 
and some additional examples. Codd’s theory was chosen as an example because 
it is a well-known product-type design theory and was also used as an example by 
Walls et al. (1992).  Using it here shows that the additional components proposed 
for an ISDT are present in this theory. The example from Chiang and Mookerjee 
(2004) was chosen, because, while it has a narrow scope, it gives an example of a 
method-type theory which can be captured in a relatively brief description.  The risk 
management example from Iversen, Mathiassen and Nielsen (2004) was chosen 
because it describes an organizational intervention process developed through 
action research and shows a wider conceptualization of an IS artifact than the 
previous two examples2.  
 
2 This example was suggested by a reviewer of the paper, who believed it presented a challenge for the 
theory specification framework.  
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Table 4: Components of a design theory for a software threshold fault policy 
 Type Component examples 
(1) Purpose and 
scope 
The aim is to develop a fault threshold policy to determine 
when system integration occurs during a process of 
incremental systems development. 
The policy is developed for homogeneous systems, where 
modules are similar in size and complexity and all faults 
take roughly the same effort to fix. The policy is appropriate 
for systems that can be tested frequently and at relatively 
low cost. The policy is designed to consider a number of 
project parameters (such as complexity). 
 
(2) Constructs Examples are: incremental development, system 
integration, fault threshold, testing, faults detected. 
 
(3) Principles of form 
and function 
The policy uses a derived expression to give dynamic 
guidelines for when system integration should occur, with 
(1) a region of no integration, (2) a region where integration 
occurs depending on a fault count, and (3) a region in which 
systems integration should always take place.  
 
(4) Artifact mutability The designers consider the effects of team learning that 
occurs over multiple construction cycles and show how the 
policy will vary over a number of cycles.  
 
(5) Testable 
propositions 
Predictions about outcomes are provided which are tested 
in simulation experiments.  
 
(6) Justificatory 
knowledge 
Theory is offered relating to group coordination processes, 
team cognition, software development productivity, and fault 
growth models.  
 
(7) Principles of 
implementation 
Not a great deal of detail is given on how to build a concrete 
version of this abstract policy in specific projects. An 
example is given where the formulae in the policy are 
applied to an imaginary scenario. It is stated that it might be 
necessary to build some randomness into the model in a 
real-life project and this is left for further work. 
 
(8) Expository 
instantiation 
Examples of the policy in action are provided through 
simulations.  
 
Note: Adapted from Chiang and Mookerjee (2004) . 
 
Table 5: Components of a design theory for managing risk in software 
development 
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 Type Component examples 
(1) Purpose and scope The aim is to develop an approach for understanding 
and managing risk in software process improvement 
(SPI). 
 
(2) Constructs For example: risk item, risky incident, resolution 
actions.  
 
(3) Principles of form and 
function 
A risk framework is given to aid in the identification and 
categorization of risks and a process with four steps is 
given to show heuristics that can be used to relate 
identified risk areas to resolution strategies.  
 
(4) Artifact mutability Suggestions for improving the approach are given for 
further work: one example is that parts of the approach 
could be packaged as a self-guiding computer-based 
system. 
 
5) Testable propositions It is claimed that the approach is adaptable to other 
organizational settings, although it is seen as a generic 
approach, rather than a procedure to be followed 
blindly (pp. 422-423). 
 
(6) Justificatory knowledge The approach proposed is derived from other risk 
management approaches (other design theories).  
 
(7) Principles of 
implementation 
It is stated that the approach requires facilitation by a 
facilitator experienced in risk management, SPI and 
running collaborative workshops.   
  
(8) Expository instantiation Four examples of variants of the approach are given in 
descriptions of four iterations of an action research 
cycle.  
 
Note: Adapted from Iversen et al. (2004). This article contains two design theories, with the 
second being a more general approach for tailoring risk management to specific 
contexts. This second theory is omitted in the interests of simplicity.  
 
1) THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This design component says “what the system is for”. the set of meta-requirements 
or goals that specifies the type of system to which the theory applies and in 
conjunction also defines the scope, or boundaries, of the theory.  
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The artifact requirements should be understood in terms of the environment in 
which it is to operate. Heidegger (1993) used an example of a silver chalice, where 
in order to understand its purpose, we need to understand the religious ritual in 
which the chalice is to be used. Both the relational database theory and the 
software fault policy are described in terms of the context in which they are intended 
to operate. Statements in the article about the software faults policy show that it is 
meant to apply to certain environments, for example, where systems can be tested 
at relatively low cost. Codd (1982) described the need for the relational database 
model in the context of large databases being accessed by many people and where 
productivity is important. 
 
These theory requirements are meta-requirements; they are not the requirements 
for one instance of a system, as would be the case if there was a need to build a 
single system in industry. The aim is to develop a design theory that is suited to a 
whole class of artifacts that are typified by these requirements. This component of 
the design theory is similar to the “scope” of other theory types, the area over which 
the theory is generalized, or what Dubin (1978) sees as defined by the “boundaries” 
of a theory. In defining the goals of an artifact, other goals are excluded and the 
boundaries of the theory are shown. For example, Codd’s relationship database 
theory is about the design of databases, not single file structures, which are outside 
the scope of his theory.  
 
This aspect of the theory formulation allows different theories to be categorized, 
compared and extended. For example, a contribution to an ISDT for decision 
support systems would be expected to show that it filled some gap in existing ISDT, 
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offered an ISDT that was superior in some way to existing ISDT, or extended an 
existing ISDT for this type of system. This aspect thus provides guidance when it 
comes to evaluating a design theory. Codd (1982) compares the capabilities of the 
relational model with other non-relational models for database design. Chiang and 
Mookerjee (2004) claimed that their dynamic threshold policy is an advance on 
other non-dynamic policies that have similar aims but where the integration points 
are determined a priori.  Iversen et al. (2004, p. 422) claim theoretical significance 
for their work in managing risks when they state that it is the first “comprehensive” 
process that helps software improvement teams  manage risk.  
2)  CONSTRUCTS 
The representations of the entities of interest in the theory (Dubin’s “units”) are at 
the most basic level in any theory. These entities could be physical phenomena or 
abstract theoretical terms. Often the entities will be represented by words, such as 
“software fault”, but mathematical symbols or parts of a diagram can also be used. 
Codd used the set theoretical expression of an “n-ary relation” to represent a 
relational database table. Iversen et al. (2004, pp. 401-402), describe the concepts 
of “risk items”, “risk incidents”, “resolution actions” and “heuristics” on which their 
theory builds.  
 
As in any theory, the terms used to refer to the entities of interest should be defined 
as clearly as possible. A feature of design theories for information technologies is 
that a single construct in a theory can represent a sub-system that has its own 
separate design theory. One of the constructs in the fault threshold policy is “system 
integration”. This process itself is composed of many different activities. This 
technique of decomposing design problems into semi-independent parts is one way 
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of dealing with complexity (Simon, 1996). The design of each component can then 
be carried out with some degree of independence of the design of others, since 
each will affect the others largely through its functioning and independently of the 
details of the mechanisms that accomplish the function. At the higher level it is not 
necessary for the designer to understand the detailed complexities of all the design 
sub-parts. The result is that the description of a construct in a design theory may be 
indicative, rather than detailed and complete.  
3)  PRINCIPLES OF FORM AND FUNCTION 
This component refers to the principles which define the structure, organization and 
functioning of the design product or design method. The shape of a design product 
is seen in the properties, functions, features or attributes that the product possesses 
when constructed. For example, a design theory for a word processor would show 
how an operational system should include file manipulation features, text 
manipulation features and so on, and how these features were interrelated. In a 
sense this component gives an abstract “blueprint” or architecture for the 
construction of an IS artifact. Similarly, the principles of a design method show in a 
generalized form the shape and features of the method, for example the steps in 
the waterfall model of the systems development life cycle.  Iversen et al. (2004) 
describe in detail the heuristics that help software process improvement 
practitioners relate identified risk areas to possible resolution strategies through a 
four step process.  
 
Much of the knowledge in IS textbooks that concerns application systems 
represents examples of this important component of design theories. An example is 
the depiction of the architecture of decision support systems (DSS) by McNurlin and 
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Sprague (2002) as including: (1) a database management system; (2) a model base 
management system; and (3) a dialogue generation system. It is interesting to note 
that this architectural description of DSS uses words for both their form (their 
components and how they are related) and also their functions (providing data, 
providing modeling tools, and interacting with users). The abstract form of a DSS is 
depicted in a diagram (p. 369) with boxes to represent the components and arcs 
showing the interaction between the parts (and the user). 
 
In other design theories this intermingling of structural and functional properties in 
the architectural description also occurs. Codd describes both the form of relational 
tables and how they are used, in terms of access and manipulation. Chiang and 
Mookerjee showed how their software fault policy functions in predicting integration 
points. These observations highlight the importance of recognizing both form and 
function in the architectural component. 
4) ARTIFACT MUTABILITY  
One component of ISDTs arises from consideration of the special nature of the IS 
artifact. There is increasing recognition of the mutable nature of these artifacts. That 
is, they are artifacts that are in an almost constant state of change. Simon (1996) 
spoke of evolving artifacts, where flexibility and adaptability could be enabled by 
feedback loops to refine design. O’Hear (1989, p. 220) writes of an “evolutionary 
trajectory” rather than “a design” for technologies and notes the attempt to predict 
the direction or outcome of a particular technological innovation in advance is bound 
to be uncertain. Jarvinen (2001) gives some consideration to “what happens after” 
in suggesting that evaluation should cover three stages: build, use and demolish 
(transition to new or death). Added to these ideas of the changing nature of the 
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artifact is Heidegger’s discussion of poiēsis with respect to artifacts, the idea of the 
arising of something from out of itself, or emergent properties and behaviour. 
Supporting views for this component are also expressed by Orlikowski and Iacono 
(2001, p. 121): 
 
We believe that the lack of theories about IT artifacts, the ways in which they 
emerge and evolve over time, and how they become interdependent with socio-
economic contexts and practices, are key unresolved issues for our field and ones 
that will become even more problematic in these dynamic and innovative times. 
 
Specifying the degree of mutability of designed artifacts has some parallels with the 
specification of the states of a physical system covered by a natural science-type 
theory as recommended by Dubin (1978), but goes further in that it may deal not 
only with changes in system state, but also with changes that affect the basic form 
or shape of the artifact- as, for example, in allowing for a certain amount of 
adaptation or evolution.  
 
Evidence of reflections on the mutability of designed artifacts can be found in the 
three examples presented. A primary objective of the relational database design 
was to allow users of databases and application programmers to remain unaffected 
by changes in the internal representation of data. The authors of the fault threshold 
policy consider the effects of learning by the project team and how the rate at which 
new faults arise will be reduced. Iversen et al. (2004) believe that their risk 
management approach can be used with benefit by different organizations, but that 
it may need to be adapted by adding specific risk items or resolution actions to suit 
the organizational context.  
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5) TESTABLE PROPOSITIONS 
An ISDT can give rise to testable propositions or hypotheses about the system or 
tool to be constructed. These propositions can take the general form “If a system or 
method that follows certain principles is instantiated then it will work, or it will be 
better in some way than other systems or methods”.  
Walls et al. (1992) give the following reasons for having testable propositions: 
• For testable design product hypotheses, there is a need to test 
whether the meta-design (the architectural principles) satisfies the 
meta-requirements; 
• For testable design process hypotheses, there is a need to verify 
whether or not the design method (implementation principles) results 
in an artifact that is consistent with the meta-design (architectural 
principles).  
 
Nunamaker et al. (1990-91) include as one of their five criteria for the evaluation of 
systems development work the need for the system to be testable against all the 
stated objectives and requirements. Van Aken (2004) distinguishes two forms of 
these design propositions. Algorithmic propositions are more general, typically have 
a quantitative format and can be tested on the basis of observations and statistical 
analyses. Heuristic propositions typically take the form “if you want to achieve Y in 
situation Z, then something like action X will help” (p. 227, emphasis added).  This 
proposition is less general and represents a design exemplar that needs translation 
to a specific problem at hand to be used and tested.  
 
The degree to which design knowledge can be expressed in general propositions 
remains an issue. Some degree of generality is recognized as a prerequisite for 
theory, even broadly defined (Gregor, 2006).  The generality issue is a particular 
problem when design knowledge arises from artifact construction, action research 
and case studies, as it does in IS and many applied disciplines. Problems with 
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generating theory from practice and ideographic case studies have long been 
recognized (see, for example, Tsoukas, 1989).  We concur with van Aken’s view 
that design theory propositions can vary in their degree of generality - from claims 
that a design works all the time and in many contexts (as with an algorithm) to 
claims that a design proposition is only an approximation to what will work in 
different contexts.  We recognize that this issue is worthy of further debate. 
However it is sufficient for our purposes to argue (following Simon), that even if 
design knowledge is only in part, or with difficulty, expressed in formal general 
terms, that this goal is still an important one for applied disciplines such as IS (see 
also Purao, 2002; Rossi and Sein, 2003; Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2004/5). 
 
Testing theoretical design propositions is demonstrated through an instantiation, by 
constructing a system or implementing a method, or possibly in rare cases through 
deductive logic (Gregg et al,. 2001; Hevner and March, 2003). 
6) JUSTIFICATORY KNOWLEDGE 
This component provides the justificatory, explanatory knowledge that links goals, 
shape, processes, and materials. Some knowledge is needed of how material 
objects behave so as to judge their capabilities for a design. For example, the 
bandwidth of communication channels limits designs of e-commerce systems by 
placing limits on data carried within a time period.  Knowledge of human cognitive 
capacities heavily influences principles of human-computer interaction design. 
Simon (1996) refered to these theories as “micro theories” and Walls et al. (1992) 
as “kernel theories”. Walls et al. (1992) saw kernel theories as informing design 
products and design processes separately. Here we argue that these theories are a 
linking mechanism for a number, or all, of the other aspects of the design theory. 
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The nature, depth and degree of reliance on micro theories in ISDT is arguable. 
Theories might come from natural science, social science (Simon, 1996), other 
design theories, practitioner-in-use theories (Sarker and Lee, 2002) or evidence-
based justification such as seen in medical research and action research (Van 
Aken, 2004). The design theory for managing risk in software development (Table 
5) relies on prior practice, other design theory and action research, but not theory of 
the natural science type. Simon argued that it is possible to have a design theory 
with an incomplete understanding of the micro-theories on which it is based.  
 
We do not have to know, or guess at all the internal structure of the system 
components, but only that part of it that is crucial to the abstraction in the design 
theory. An example is given of the first time-sharing computer systems, where only 
fragments of theory were available to guide initial designs. In any new discipline 
people often do things for which theory has no explanation and provides no 
foundation, and theory evolves only after practice has demonstrated that something 
works (Glass, 1996). Natural science explanations of how and why an artifact works 
may lag years behind the application of the artifact (March and Smith, 1995).  
 
Should we settle for knowing that something works without knowing why it works? 
Venable (2006) argues that justificatory knowledge is not required as a necessary 
component of an ISDT. In contrast, we argue that it remains essential to include 
justificatory knowledge in ISDTs, although this knowledge could be incomplete. The 
justificatory knowledge provides an explanation of why an artifact is constructed as 
it is and why it works, and explanations are usually regarded as a desirable part of a 
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theory specification, assisting with their communicative purpose and the facilitation 
of human understanding (see Gregor, 2006; Nagel, 1979; Popper, 1980).  Van 
Aken (2004, p. 228) offers a similar view - arguing that real breakthroughs in human 
understanding have occurred when tested technological rules can be grounded on 
scientific knowledge:  
One can design an aeroplane wing on the basis of tested, technological 
(black-box) rules, but such wings can be designed much more efficiently on 
the basis of tested and grounded technological rules, grounded on the laws 
and insights of aerodynamic and mechanics.  
 
With information technology we have the interesting situation where some design 
knowledge is originally presented with an underlying justification from the behavioral 
sciences but this underlying justification is later either forgotten or neglected. Who 
now recalls that Codd’s relational database theory had a behavioral science 
justification? One of the reasons for advancing relational database theory was that 
human programmers had difficulty with the complex reasoning needed to handle 
repeating groups of data items. It is important to remember this justification and that 
the normal forms of relational databases are not an end in themselves. In situations 
where efficiency is of prime importance a better design could use another database 
structure that allows repeating groups, to give faster access to data. Other similar 
examples can be found, for example in the paradigms of structured-programming 
and object-oriented programming.  Human-computer interaction and web design 
offer further examples. Shneiderman (1998) shows how principles of interface 
design rest on models of human memory and cognition, which means that the 
designer has more, and deeper, knowledge to rely on when interpreting design 
guidelines in particular circumstances. In contrast, other books on web design 
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merely offer long lists of rather random and seemingly unconnected design 
guidelines, as in “Heathrow- literature” in management (Burrell, 1989).   
 
It is difficult to envision situations where there is a complete absence of justificatory 
knowledge. Further, the limitations themselves can be important.  For researchers, 
such limited knowledge provides indicators of potential fruitful areas for future 
research, with the phenomena that arise out of the creation of design science 
artifacts the targets of natural science or social science research (March and Smith, 
1995). Takeda et al. (1990) express a similar view and see new knowledge 
generated through design activity when post-design reflection shows that the 
theories that motivated the design are incomplete. Justificatory knowledge also 
provides both researchers and practitioners with information useful in comparing 
competing ISDTs. All other considerations being equal, an ISDT with stronger, more 
complete justificatory knowledge would usually be the more appropriate choice.3 
 
Examples show the range of theories relied upon in designs. Codd’s relational 
database design relied on knowledge from mathematical set theory, relational 
algebra and some understanding of the limitations of human cognition and human 
tendency to error. Chiang and Mookerjee (2004) build their policy of fault thresholds 
from knowledge of group coordination processes, team cognition, software 
development productivity, and fault growth models.  
7) PRINCIPLES OF IMPLEMENTATION 
This component concerns the means by which the design is brought into being – a 
3 Just as we would more likely choose a medical treatment or drug when we understood something of 
why it worked, compared with the case when there was no underlying justification for its efficacy. 
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process involving agents and actions. Simon (1996, p. 130) believed that process 
and product were inextricably linked.  
What we ordinarily call “style” may stem just as much from these decisions about 
the design process as from alternative emphases on the goals to be realized 
through the final design … both the shape of the design and organization of the 
design process are essential components of a theory of design.   
 
Several examples illustrate the nature of this component. Normalization principles 
are available in relational database theory to guide the database builder who is 
constructing a specific database. McNurlin and Sprague (2002) describe several 
methods for building instances of DSS, including DSS generators. They also 
describe how different processes can be followed to build variants of the DSS 
design: institutional DSS and “quick hit” DSS. 
 
Principles can also be provided for the implementation in practice of an abstract, 
generic design method or development approach. To give an example, Sommerville 
(2001) shows the generic steps in the prototyping process as: (1) establish 
prototype objectives; (2) define prototype functionality; (3) develop prototype; and 
(4) evaluate prototype. Specific advice is also given on how to implement these 
general principles in practice: for example, to reduce prototyping costs and 
accelerate the delivery schedule, some functionality can be omitted from the 
prototype.  
 
The example of the fault threshold policy illustrates further this concept of “the 
process of implementing a process”. Chiang and Mookerjee (2004) showed how the 
policy varies with project parameters, including project complexity, the skills of the 
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project team, the development environment and the schedule flexibility. The 
provision of implementation principles in their design theory would mean specifying 
explicitly the steps a project manager would take to incorporate these parameters 
into the policy formulae in implementing the policy in a project. Iversen et al. (2004), 
give advice on how their generic approach to risk management can be used in 
specific contexts, suggesting particularly that an experienced facilitator is required.  
8) EXPOSITORY INSTANTIATION 
Hevner et al. (2004) believed that “design research must produce a viable artifact in 
the form of a construct, model, method or instantiation”. A realistic implementation 
contributes to the identification of potential problems in a theorized design and in 
demonstrating that the design is worth considering. The question that remains is 
whether an instantiation can be a component of a theory. Instantiated artifacts are 
things in the physical world, while a theory is an abstract expression of ideas about 
the phenomena in the physical world.  
 
We make an argument for including an instantiation as a possible component in an 
ISDT for the purposes of theory representation or exposition. Theory in the natural 
sciences has traditionally been represented in natural language statements or in 
mathematical notation. A further consideration is that the artifact itself has some 
representational power - an artifact can assist with the communication of the design 
principles in a theory. To take an example, the placement of items on a computer 
screen can be described using screen coordinates. This process is tedious and the 
results are not very understandable. A copy of a screen display is more immediately 
comprehended and would serve better if one was illustrating some guidelines for a 
screen design. Similarly, a prototype system can often be used to illustrate how a 
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system functions, with better communicative power than a natural language 
description. However, if the instantiation or artifact is all that there is, rather than a 
theory of design, then following Cross’s argument (2001) expressed previously, the 
level of knowledge is that of a craft-based discipline.  
 
Both Codd (1970) and Chiang and Mookerjee (2004) used mock-ups of real 
systems to help explain their designs. Codd gave a simple example of the rows and 
columns and data elements in a relational database table and the fault threshold 
policy is demonstrated in a scenario with invented project attributes. Iversen et al. 
(2004) present examples of their risk management approach in a Danish bank as it 
evolved through an action research cycle. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The aim of this research essay was to delineate the possible components of a 
design theory for IS, providing an ontological language for the discussion of these 
theories. Eight separate components were distinguished: (1) the purpose and 
scope; (2) constructs; (3) principles of form and function; (4) artifact mutability; (5) 
testable propositions; (6) justificatory knowledge; (7) principles of implementation; 
and (8) an expository instantiation. 
 
The essay reviewed prior work with relevance, including Simon’s monograph on the 
sciences of the artificial, views from other disciplines and views from philosophy 
more generally. The work of Walls et al. (1992) provided a prior attempt at the 
specification of the components of a design theory for IS. We have extended this 
work, however, by merging ideas from the other sources that were reviewed and by 
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more careful examination of Dubin (1978) and Simon (1996). We have also taken 
some ideas from the design science field, particularly in regard to the potential 
importance of an instantiation of a design theory.  
 
Two aspects of the ontology we propose are novel in terms of the structural nature 
of theory generally. The first is in recognizing the role of an instantiation of a design 
theory as an expository or representational tool. That is, an instantiation such as a 
prototype can be seen as serving a communicative purpose in illustrating the design 
principles that are embodied within it. The second is in recognizing the degree to 
which IS design theories deal with mutable, or changeable, artifacts. Design 
theories can deal with mutability in a number of ways, but it should be recognized 
that this is a special component of an IS design theory.  
 
The detailed anatomy of a design theory that is presented is itself a theory, a theory 
that analyses and describes. Gregor (2006) suggests that this type of theory (Type 
1) can be assessed by considering whether any framework  developed is useful in 
aiding analysis, whether elements of the framework are meaningful, natural and 
well-defined and whether any categorization is  complete and exhaustive. The 
degree to which the framework in this paper is useful to other researchers in 
analyzing and formulating theory is something that needs to be investigated through 
further application in practice. We have attempted to describe all constructs as 
clearly as possible, and our synthesis of prior work leads us to believe that our list of 
the structural components of design theory is fuller than any given previously. 
Analysis of examples of design theories using our framework identified no additional 
structural elements of theory that should be included. Other aspects of research 
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publications found (for example, research approach, motivation, evaluation and 
claims of significance) are not part of a theory.  Nor was any over-specification in 
our framework found. There were no structural elements that could not be matched 
in design theory articles taken from leading IS journals.  Only a small number of 
articles were analyzed, however, and further research could usefully test the 
framework against a larger sample.  
 
This paper has focused on the structural components of design theory, but some 
consideration can also be given to how the ideas developed are used in practice. 
The listing of the theory components gives some guidelines to what might be 
included in an article or thesis that reports constructive research. It could be 
expected in a full, well-developed theory that all components would be present in 
some form. Theory that is in earlier stages of development might contain a sub-set 
of the components. For example, Hall, Paradice and Courtney (2003) propose a 
theory for learning-oriented knowledge management system that does not include 
an instantiation. The exemplar articles we studied included all eight theory 
components, although some had to be searched for.  
 
Epistemological concerns regarding the building and testing of design theory and 
criteria for judging its worth have been dealt with elsewhere (see March and Smith, 
1995; Hevner et al., 2004) and were not the focus of this essay. However, a number 
of relevant points can be deduced from our proposals in this essay.  
 
The first is the importance of specifying the goals and scope of the theory clearly. It 
is this component that allows new theories to be compared with existing design 
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theories with similar goals and scope, providing a basis for judging whether the new 
theory offers a further contribution to knowledge. Researchers should review prior 
knowledge regarding the design of artifacts with similar goals, although the artifacts 
may be classified under different labels, reflecting our discipline's predilection for 
new names for new waves of technology. Thus, for example, work on a system 
described as a knowledge management system should review relevant prior work 
on expert systems or decision support systems.  
 
Second, the nature of theory building for designs can be recognized. If we return to 
Simon’s work, we find several descriptions of how the construction of an artifact can 
precede the knowledge of why it works. The extreme complexity of modern 
computer systems means that the design and building of systems is an iterative 
process, as recognized in software engineering methodologies (Sommerville, 2001) 
and the documentation of how and why a system works is likely to occur after the 
fact. Theory recorded after-the-fact is by no means less of a theory so long as it still 
satisfies the requirements of being abstract and general. That is, when reflecting on 
the construction of a particular system, one would need to represent the important 
principles underlying its construction in such a way that they are applicable to other 
systems yet to be constructed. A number of instantiations in multiple case studies 
may need to be studied before the general principles enabling them to function can 
be extracted (see van Aken, 2004). 
 
Third, we can offer some observations about the degree to which design theorizing 
resembles what occurs in the natural sciences. Design activities include elements of 
creativity and imagination. Given many components for a system, all of which could 
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be combined in myriad ways, all theoretically sound, an experienced designer will 
likely employ some “art” in transforming the components into a novel and workable 
system. Simon’s work is influenced by the notion that design is a creative activity 
and therefore may not be able to rely on existing theory. The question remains open 
as to whether “science” is an appropriate word to apply to IS design theory, given 
the degree of creativity involved.4  
 
This paper makes contributions at several levels. Novice researchers should benefit 
from the depiction of the basic components of design theory, helping with the 
question of “What is design theory?” At a conceptual level, we have provided an 
advance on previous work in systematically searching for and combining differing 
perspectives on the components of design theory, addressing the challenge posed 
by Walls et al. (2004) recently to “re-examine the structure of ISDT and enhance its 
usability through a better structure”. The outcome is a specification framework that 
is more complete and contains important components that were absent in earlier 
work. Novel aspects of the paper are the recognition that the “mutability” of IS 
artifacts should be reflected in theorizing about these artifacts and that instantiations 
can assist in communicating a design theory. 
 
In a practical sense, this more rigorous approach to specifying design theory should 
assist with the development of cumulative design theory that is relevant to industry 
and for raising our discipline above the craft-level. Walls et al. (1992) provided a 
valuable start in this direction. Our new specification is more complete and some 
concerns with the Walls et al specification have been addressed, which we believe 
4 Although it is recognized that science in practice is also likely to involve some aspects of creativity. 
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will make the specification more usable.  More use and understanding of the nature 
of theory resulting from design research should assist with more cumulative 
knowledge building. Design theories are more likely to be cumulative if new 
attempts at theorizing clearly identify the prior theory that relates to the problem 
area, which is identified by the “purpose and scope” component, and then build on 
as much relevant prior work as possible. For example, if the problem area is “how to 
elicit knowledge from experts” then a researcher should identify existing work that 
that has tackled this problem, without concern for the labels under which the work 
has been done, whether in artificial intelligence, expert systems or knowledge 
management, or in industry case studies.  It is design knowledge that is of vital 
concern to industry and improving design theorizing should increase the relevance 
of our work.  
 
The depiction of design theory in this essay may have relevance to other applied 
disciplines, but it also helps define what is unique about the IS discipline, namely 
the construction of mutable artifacts where complexity arises from the interaction of 
humans with information technology. Whether the anatomical framework applies to 
other disciplines could be a question for further research.  
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